Abstract: Like other service sectors, information technology has dramatically altered the growth and character of the retail trade sector in the affluent economies. Nevertheless, significant variation exists in the typical strategies of retail firms in different countries. This article explores this variation and proposes both an ideal type and an explanation. It argues that the problems of markets and hierarchies in retailing were set in motion by a series of political fights starting in the 1960s and 1970s. This demonstrates that once again that technical outcomes are not determined by the technology itself, but by social and political rules. Future technology platforms, such as e-commerce of mobile commerce, should be expected to follow similar political logics. As retailing firms spread around the globe, this has important implications for national competition policy.
I. Introduction
The economies of the advanced, formerly industrial democracies are undergoing a radical transformation. Similar to other economic revolutions, this metamorphosis is entangled with technology. Unlike previous industrial divides, however, this transformation is driven by services, not manufacturing (Zysman et al. 2007) . Services, once a productivity quagmire, are now recognized as a source of productivity growth and engine of the economy, altering the structure of employment, the division of labor, and the location of value in the economy (Triplett and Bosworth 2004; Levy and Murnane 2004) .
One of the most radical reorganizations has occurred in the retail trade sector.
Over the past 30 years, information technology (IT) has both transformed the sectorincluding its major players, its geographic location, and the character of its firms -and the basic equation of how value is captured in the consumer retailing value domain.
There have been common transnational patterns during retail's metamorphosis, including two interwoven movements: the increase in the advantages of and the presence of scale in retailing and a dramatic rise in the power of retailers through information gathering and analysis.
At the same time, how the retail revolution has unfolded differs dramatically by country, including the character of firms, power relations in the economy, and tangible outcomes like wage and price levels for workers and consumers. This article will use the retailing case as a test case for the larger services transformation research agenda. The evidence shows that the importance of the services revolution goes beyond the growing contribution services to economic activity in the advanced economies. In addition, retailing underlines a broader story about how digital technology transforms service activities, re-organizes the service components of the economy, and reshuffles relationships between service firms, workers, producers, and policy-makers. In doing so, it highlights the numerous challenges and conflicts that emerge in a political economy where IT-enabled services are central to employment and productivity. Surprisingly, many of these broader political, social, and economic implications are yet to be systematically studied.
Sector-specific research in comparative context provides an essential tool for examining the services transformation. Sectors control for a variety issues, highlighting where variation in political, social, and institutional variables alters market and firm outcomes. Sector cases, therefore, allow an investigation of how common technological developments are mediated and interpreted across different sets of formal institutions, political coalitions, markets, and social settings. They also allow insights into the correct level of analysis for studying economic and political change. The nodes of contestation evolve during any economic transformation, while level of governance questions are particularly important for Europe with its patchwork of political actors and regulations. Sector studies illuminate at which level the primary political action is occurring, quickly updating models of political, technological, and economic change.
The data show that retailing provides an excellent starting point for two reasons.
First, the pace of retailing growth has undeniably changed. Secondly, examining firm outcomes in retailing, it is clear that business strategies cannot be reduced to either a techno-determinist story or simply a tale of labor markets, wages, and labor skills. The problems of markets and hierarchies in retailing are in fact being resolved by a variety of political fights, demonstrating once more that technical outcomes are not determined by the technology itself, but by social and political rules. Importantly, the retailing revolution is both influenced by and has radical implications for politics and coalitions. How retailers organized politically in the 1960s and 1970s to win fights with independent small-shop retailers over rules on such issues as prices, planning, opening hours, and store size and construction locked in particular modes of interaction with suppliers and workers, prompting unique business-model configurations in the search for efficiency and competitive advantage. Tracing forward, these initial political and economic plans continue to shape the business strategies and political alliances of large retailers in the current era -one where growth stems from using technology in core processes to create innovation.
Although the marriage of technology and scale has opened a variety of new business strategy opportunities for retailers, firms have implemented quite different processes of routinization, data analysis, and value capture across borders. The article highlights three nationally-specific competitive strategies in modern general merchandise retailing. Each has a different primary focus for creating value and exhibits variation in how technology is used, product strategy, labor strategy, supplier-relations, and valueadded strategy.
Retailers did not adopt one or another of these strategies simply because one is more efficient. In fact, the basic business models of retailers across the affluent 1 Retailing services were traditionally just the final step in delivering producer products to consumers, but as we will see, the value captured by retailers has rapidly expanded to cover nearly every facet of consumer goods (including branding, marketing, and even production), basic consumer services such as finance, and even technology domains such as data analysis or web hosting. It is notable that when WikiLeaks, the controversial non-profit, came under web attack in November of 2010, it initially turned to Amazon, an on-line retailer to host its site. high turnover strategy based on squeezing costs and contested relationships with labor, suppliers, and local governments. Retailers pass some of the savings from cost-savings on to consumers, while largely excluding workers and suppliers from the gains.
2 The name invites parallels to lean production, with its focus on just-in-time production, lean inventories, and horizontal networks of suppliers organized around a final "assembly" firm. The parallel with lean production should not be taken too far, however, as there are numerous differences. Outside of the logistics, "lean" inventories, and just-in-time delivery, lean retailing resembles Fordism more than it does a Japanese automaker, with unskilled workers and repetitive tasks. Whereas some of the features of the logistics features of lean production are present in all of the successful models of retailing -most notably a reduction in inventories in relation to sales and more frequent just-in-time delivery of goods, the lean retailing model best approximates the acute cost focus across the board. It is also worth noting that the term lean production was first applied to the automobile industry as a comparison with supermarkets (Magee, 2007) . 3 The relational contracting model is often accused of being either caused by high wages or simply supported by high prices. Although wages are certainly higher than in the lean retailing United States, a causal arrow should not be drawn from high wages to firm strategies. For one, other nations with high wage levels (such as France) have quite different firm tendencies. In addition, wages are often well above minimum wage levels and their persistence suggests benefits to retailers, which will be elaborated later in the paper. On costs, there is little evidence that costs explain the majority of firm strategies or productivity in these countries -and as Walmart learned in Germany -are often be quite competitive with more liberal countries. If anything, high costs are the result of the same factors that drove firm strategies, broad coalitions more focused on social concerns than simply lowering consumer prices.
This paper will present significant evidence not only that each of these strategies exists, but also that each is persistent and high competitive. Nevertheless, they should not be interpreted as the only game in town, simply as archetypes of nation-specific tendencies. Many of the features discussed, such as the use of product data in supplier negotiations, technology to train workers, or added services and private labels are features of leading retailers across the world. What is different, however, is the level and character of each across national borders.
The rest of this article will trace the development of these business models. A first section will highlight the variety of potential opportunities opened by the marriage of digital technology and scale, elaborating the political fights that pushed firms down different paths, and presenting evidence of each strategy and its mode of competition. A next section will suggest how new technology platforms may affect each model in different ways. Finally, a conclusion will outline how these changes coupled with retail globalization shift the priorities of policymakers working on the retail sector.
II. From Bricks to Clicks: Stages of Retail Development
As with other information technology (IT)-enabled service sectors, the evolution of the retail sector occurred in stages. As retailers grew in size, they first used digital tools to capture information and routinize processes, such as checkout, ordering or stocking. Next, more sophisticated demand management tools began analyzing the data streams from point-of-sale (POS) databases, opening the opportunities to re-organize shop-floors, supply chains, and find complementarities (McKinsey 2001). 4 We can identify several major stages of the digital revolution in retail trade.
While the precise timing of each varies cross-nationally, the first stages began in retailing during the 1970s and expanded in the 1980s while shifts in value capture began in the 1990s and continue today.
The earliest stages involved the use of technology to increase economic and information power. Retailers first used barcode technology, scanning system, and basic purchasing software to codify information and routinize activities. Next, they began using more complicated merchandise planning and demand management software to begin organizing and analyzing the stream of sales data routinization produced. Along with complementary store changes (such as decreased warehouse space and increased sales floor space) these technologies allowed larger stores, larger store networks, increased product diversity and knowledge, all while reducing non-sales inventories.
Increased scale led to clashes with small shopkeepers and national politicians around store size, location, purchasing power, price rules, and anti-trust and competition issues. Sears struggled with its size. In 1946, General Wood, then president of the company noted its problems, stating, "I have been in an unusual position to observe the problems that 'bigness' brings to a business" (Emmet and Jeuck 1950, p. 365) . The solution was massive decentralization, breaking the firm into five almost wholly autonomous territories, and within each stores still had considerable flexibility. In 1964, a Forbes article decreased Sears as "number one in the U.S., and also number 2, 3, 4, and 5" (Katz 1987, p. 15) . Even with its successful decentralization, Sears was the anomaly, able to succeed at its size only because it set the market, telling consumers what to buy rather than simply providing it, helping reduce demand management risks. Basic digital product and sales information then cascades through the rest of these stages.
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The ability to store information about product price and stock levels through barcodes revolutionizes store operations. In addition to accelerating the movement toward self-service in retail, stores are able to reduce inventory checks (a timely and costly procedure), speed-up checkout times, and generally create the types of innovations toward larger-volume formats, reaping the benefits of greater scale while keeping organizational challenges in check. 9 In addition, IT has also provided a valuable tool for headquarters to effectively manage large chains of stores. IT allows a central location to communicate with stores, gather the incredible stream of information from various locations for analysis, and coordinate larger distribution networks more seamlessly. Data on electronic data interchange systems (EDI), which are used to automatically place orders with suppliers, shows the increasing routinization of retail. Hwang and Weil (1998) find that the use of EDI by retail firms increased from 33 to 83 percent in the period from 1988 to 1992 alone.
Once product information is digitized, retailers can begin analysis of sales information, allowing superior management of both inventories and price decisions.
Retailing occupies a critical economic location between manufactures and consumers. price is a fundamental component of providing retail services. While barcode technology allowed retailers enormous labor savings, equally large savings have accrued from the analysis of the point-of-sale (POS) data that barcodes generate. Since the mid-1990s, nearly every major global retailer has kept data on every purchase made across their store networks, often using loyalty cards to tie these purchases to particular customers. 10 The analysis of this data allows firms to better understand and manage consumer demand in a number of ways including: better matching of inventory to customer demand, even below the product level to features such as color, better understanding of the relationship between prices and sales, more efficient use of shelf space and more efficient store layout through recognizing sale complementarities, reduced inventory and fewer out-of-stock situations, and the potential to evaluate and optimize advertising, even at a personal level.
Again, this is not simply about cost cutting, but also about improving sales through better store layouts, keeping goods on the shelves, and generally matching demand. Dobson et al. (1998) In a telling American-centric slip, the author of the Federal Reserve study entitled the report, "Bar codes lead to frequent deliveries and superstores", focusing on how increased delivery will increase store size. Arguments on size have clear limits, as the largest retail stores today need for more than one truck a day to keep stocked. A Walmart Supercenter can stock 200,000 unique products, and daily sales are far more than one semi-truck. While it is true that small stores may not have sufficient sales to fill up a large truck's space, this argument misses the ability of dense small store networks, such as those found in Japan, with German discounters, or Danish Co-ops, to make use of the potential of more frequent delivery to multiple stores. These retailers were spurred common social and economic changes in the post-war period and process innovations including self-service, ample automobile parking, larger stores, and more product diversity. In all countries scale retailers emerged in a similar fashion, promoting self-service and the stack it high and sell it cheap philosophy.
The rapid growth in scale retailers, however, soon created clashes with independent shopkeepers, long a fixture of both the economy and the ballot box. Retailers are among the most connected actors in the economy, interacting with a variety of economic, political, and social groups. Politically, they must manage relationships ranging from international trade organizations and national regulators down to municipal governments. Within national economies, they connect with consumers, suppliers and producers, manufacturing firms, and wholesalers. The development of the three national models of retail capitalism described above is best explained by how retailers built these political partnerships in the 1960s and 1970s. The form and function of each national coalition proved a critical determinant in subsequent nation-specific business strategies; building and maintaining successful coalitions not only forged economic partnerships, it also influenced ongoing regulatory strategies for national retail sectors.
Retailers facing the most fragmented and decentralized national environments (as in the United States) faced the least organized opposition and consequently needed the fewest political partners. They faced the most liberal regulatory environments and formed lean retailing business strategies built on low levels of cooperation with workers, suppliers, and governments. In the most highly consensual and corporatist countries, by contrast, powerful external and internal opposition groups led retailers to build broad political coalitions that germinated relational contracting business models. These business strategies forced retailers to integrate labor and manufacturing partners into business strategy or face political, social, and economic consequences. These coalitions agreed to higher levels of buffering regulation in return for political and economic alliances. Finally, vertical integration retailers emerged in environments with powerful but fragmented opposition groups by mobilizing weak, short-term coalitions where advantageous for development, such as local political partnerships, minor worker concessions, and selective cooperation with industry.
Each coalition re-shaped the economic calculations of retail firms, pushing them toward different strategies of labor relations, supplier connections, product strategies, value added-services and ultimately the digital strategies that now underpin each of these Comprehensive data on technology strategies are difficult to assess, but data in Sources: Boston Consulting Group (2003), A.C. Nielsen (1997 A.C. Nielsen ( , 2005 A similar divergence in product strategy development has emerged, driven by the vertical countries. Data in table 5 show that not only do the vertical integration countries lead in private labels as a percentage of sales, but there has been little convergence. Sales 14 The relational contracting countries have closed the gap a bit, but it should be noted that this small convergence is driven largely by German hard discounters, whose strict low cost private label focus is qualitatively different than the broad basket of private label goods seen in the UK or France.
of private labels in the UK and France were 15% higher than in the US in 1995 and 18% higher in 2005. In addition, these numbers hide qualitative differences in how private label goods are used, primarily simply as low-cost alternatives in the United States versus high value added products at a variety of price and quality points. have also increased the number of retail business models. As the ways in which consumers can connect to manufacturers have increased, so too have the ways in which 15 For instance, Tesco, a British firm, has eleven private label orange juices at eight price points and eight private label yogurt brands at seven price points Kumar and Steenkamp (2007) . 16 An example of the new service opportunities can be seen in the burgeoning cloud computing business of Amazon.com. Although this strategy certainly emerged partially due to Amazon's technological expertise, its server capacity and technical infrastructure are not wholly unique in the retailing world. Other large retailers have similar opportunities should they choose to expand their digital strategies.
retailers have offered services to connect them, from companies which offer a wide of products like Amazon.com to niche sites that connect consumers with hard to find items. Nonstore retailers 4 7 3 Table 6 shows the rise of e-commerce as a force in American retailing, with internet retailers constituting the vast majority of the "non-store retailers" category.
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The data show that non-store retailers were the only sub-sector that significantly Although still relatively small compared to the global retail market, $600 billion dollars is 50% more than the total sales for Walmart in 2010 ($405 billion).
The purely digital provision of retail services via e-commerce will intensify many of the trends started by the digital revolution while opening new lines of conflict, especially in Europe where e-commerce will place increasing pressure on national regulatory differences, price levels, and product offerings. 20 It will also open new political fights between physical and digitally-based retailers over rules of the game.
Extended the arguments of this dissertation forward, the prediction would be that these political battles -over digital signatures, privacy, consumer protections, content regulation, copyright, new distribution patterns, and taxes 21 -would follow the established patterns of policymaking. 22 There are suggestions that that this is the case, hides the fact that within the sub-sector department stores experienced declines in sales (as a % of per capita spending) while discount and warehouse mass-merchandisers experienced sharp increases. 20 One story from an interview at the EU illustrates that retailers will push back. Electronic goods often sell at quite difference prices in France (more expensive) than in England. While the internet should change this, it largely has not. Why? While electronic goods like DVD players and TVs are sold more cheaply via the internet from England to France, a secondary market in manuals has sprung up, where French manuals now cost roughly the price difference between the two countries. 21 See J. Gibbs et al. (2003) for a somewhat dated view of which countries have passed ecommerce specific regulations in which areas. 22 Some rules will cut across the digital-physical divide and become more general societal fights. One good example is data privacy, which matters for both physical and online retailers as they
with American e-commerce rules being driven by market forces and market winners, French rules being hotly contested by the retailers and producers, and Danish frameworks being heavily negotiated by a variety of social partners.
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Similarly, e-commerce, and accelerating productivity will also bring changing relationships with national governments who have slowly updated their of view retailers as simply sheltered domestic players. This suggests that once again there will be political conflicts over the distribution of wealth as retailers press to protect their formerly sheltered sector and the fights of the 1970s are replayed, this time with the previous victors on the defense.
IV. Conclusions: New Dilemmas and Global Markets
For firms, digital competitors are not the only worries. Although future evolutions in technology will certainly drive further reorganizations in the strategies of retailing firms, equally great will be the challenges from the increase in retailing regionalization and globalization, driven by the spread of transnational retailers both gather information about their customers (and for online retailers, their visitors). For physical stores in the US and increasingly the UK, loyalty cards are the primary method of linking sales data to individual customers, but loyalty cards are not the only way to tie consumer information to sales data. Ito-Yokado, the firm that now owns the 7-eleven franchise, has workers enter basic customer information (age, gender, local or visitor) into computers before ringing up purchases. The way data is gathered is certainly one of the variables most affected by regulation, notably privacy laws. Differential privacy laws mean that European companies are more likely to collect aggregate data from the cards instead of customer specific data. In addition, it is harder from them to share the data with third parties. If they were to gather individual data, they need consent agreement on the front end. This also makes future mergers harder if merged companies want to use any individual data across products. See Newman (2008) for more on cross-national dataprivacy regulation and a special thanks to Abe Newman for helping me think through this complicated subject. 23 In France, the fights are often about whether to replicate/update the rules that existed in physical distribution. For instance, the 1981 Lang Law prohibited the sale of books for less than five per cent below the price set by publishers. In November 2010 the French government extended the law to include e-books.
within regional free trade associations like the European Union (EU) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and around the globe.
Pressure on national retailing tendencies will therefore come from foreign as well as domestic competition. These new entrants will bring with them strategies honed in quite different regulatory settings. In the short term, these challengers may be illequipped for competition in new markets. As the growing literature on transnational retailing is increasingly finding (Coe and Wrigley 2007) Walmart's failure is not an isolated case. Despite considerable global growth, particularly in developing markets, Carrefour -the world's number two retail -has also had numerous failures, including flops in Japan, Russia, Korea, and the United States.
Nevertheless, the increasing number of cross-border success stories suggests that retailers are finding better ways to adapt their business models to new regulatory environments, preserving the strengths they honed at home while addressing the weaknesses of these models abroad.
Regionalization, particularly within the EU has been one solution, as regional markets are more likely to approximate the regulatory conditions of home markets. In grocery retailing, Mesic (2009) reports that in 2004 the ten leading retailers in Europe averaged 30% of their sales in foreign markets, the majority of which are in Europe.
National governments will also face challenges from the dramatic changes in the retailing sector. For one, employment patterns in retailing are also changing in response to digitization. The rise of digital retailers (of both physical and digital goods) coupled with the increasing replacement of workers with digital tools (such as self checkout kiosks) has begun to change the link between economic growth and employment in the retail trade sector. Retailing growth has traditionally been highly linked with retail employment; in the past retailers that sought to increase output had few alternatives to simply increasing hours worked. As the graph below showing the hours and output of the constituent retail sub-sectors demonstrates, this relationship is weakening. The changing way retailers view employment has been starkly apparent during the recent Great Recession. In the past during downturns, retailing was often a fairly sheltered sector, where firms kept employment steady even during tough economic times.
For instance in the recession of 1974-1975, total employment dropped by 2.7 million jobs (-4.2% of the total) while retailing only lost 61,000 jobs (-0.6% of the retail total).
Similarly, during the 1981-1982 recession, total employment dropped by 2.7 million jobs (-3.5% of the total) while retailing only lost 40,000 jobs (-0.4% of the retail total). (BLS 2010).
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In contrast, from March 2008-March 2010, retailing lost over a million jobs, representing 13.5% of the total private sector job losses for the period (BLS 2010) . This is a percentage roughly in line with retail's percentage of total jobs in the economy and shows that at least in this downturn retailing moved more like a productive sector of the economy than a Baumol-afflicted sheltered sector.
Together, this means job creation strategies will need to account for the growing difficulty of creating jobs in the retail sector. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama referred to "all the good jobs from manufacturing to retail" that have come as the result of technological innovation. Unfortunately for the President's 24 Historical seasonally adjusted monthly employment data. Total employment is for total private sector. Measured from peak of employment pre-recession to nadir. Does not follow NBER definition of the recession, simply charts employment's fall during recession.
argument, the United States lost 4.2 million manufacturing employees between 1997-
(EU KLEMS database).
There are signs that retailing may be next.
Nevertheless, the final view of the retail revolution should not be a gloomy one.
There are enormous opportunities from retail's transformation, from better (if perhaps fewer) jobs to new value to be captured in foreign markets. Certainly, accelerating productivity, retail internationalization, and e-commerce will all necessitate changing relationships between national governments and retailers. Those countries slow to update their view of retailers as simply sheltered domestic players will miss out while those attentive to the needs of retailers and consumers may reap considerable benefits. How any benefits should be distributed, however, remains a political question. This suggests that once again there will be political conflicts over the distribution of wealth as retailers press to protect their formerly sheltered sector and the fights of the 1970s are replayed, this time with the previous victors on the defense.
